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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES
SUPREME CouRT - AVAILABILITY AS A PROCEDURAL REMEDY TO Avom
MULTIPLE TAXATION - The state of Massachusetts instituted an original
proceeding against the state of Missouri and individual citizens of Missouri for
leave to file a bill of complaint, alleging that M. B. Blake died domiciled in
Massachusetts; that she had created three trusts of securities, reserving a power
of revocation over two; that the securities were held in Missouri where the
trustees resided; that both states had statutes subjecting to taxation property
passing by deed, grant or gift, made or intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment after the donor's death; that the Massachusetts statute taxed intangible property only when owned by inhabitants; that the Missouri statute
exempted intangibles of residents of states e~ending reciprocal exemptions to
Missouri; that both states claimed the exclusive right to impose inheritance taxes
on such trusts; that Missouri intended to exercise jurisdiction over the trustees
and corpus to the exclusion of Massachusetts; that the estate in Massachusetts
had been exhausted by federal taxes and administration costs; that Massachusetts
claimed$ I 37,000 if such trusts were taxable, $ I 2 7,ooo if they were not. Claiming no other adequate remedy, Massachusetts asked that it be determined which
state had the "jurisdiction and lawful right to impose transfer, succession or
inheritance taxes" on the trusts; coupled with this was a general prayer for
1 Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights," 27 YALE L. J. 656
(1918); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198
(1918).
8 Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N. W. 305 (1927); Riser v. Riser,
240 Mich. 402, 215 N. W. 290 (1927).
9 Markham v. Markham, 4 Mich. 305 (1856) (but note that in Michigan a wife
may not sue her husband to enforce a purely executi:>ry contract); Jenne v. Marble,
37 Mich. 319 (1877). In general, see dissenting opinion of Crouch, J., in Mertz
v.. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 594 (1936).
10 3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 13057, enacted in 1855.
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relief by injunction. Held, the motion for leave to file the proposed bill of complaint should be denied since the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain this
original suit. No justiciable controversy was presented between states since it
appeared that the property in Missouri was sufficient to satisfy the claims of both
and, therefore, Massachusetts was not injured by the collection of the Missouri
tax. Moreover, no controversy arose over the enforcement of the reciprocal
provisions, for the Missouri statute conferred no contractual right upon Massachusetts. Futhermore, Massachusetts could not invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court for the benefit of its citizens on the theory that they were entitled to the
immunities so offered. Neither could jurisdiction be sustained as a controversy
between Massachusetts and citizens of Missouri, i.e., the trustees, for the bill
was not so framed as to present such a controversy independent of a contro"versy
between states. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. I, 60 S. Ct. 39 (1939).1
By a series of cases extending from 1930 to 1932,2 it was considered as
settled that only the state of domicile of the owner of intangible property could
constitutionally impose an inheritance tax, on the theory mohilia sequuntur
,personam. Since then, it has become apparent that, due to the inadequacy of
procedural devices, where two or more states each claim to be the domicile of
the decedent, and judicially determine that to be a fact, each may constitutionally
impose death taxes on such estates. The Dorrance saga demonstrates this only
too well.8 An original suit was used in Texas v. Florida-¼ to avoid this result.
In that case, each of four states claimed the right to tax decedent's intangible
estate on the theory that each was his domicile. Florida instituted an original
suit in the Supreme Court in the nature of a bill of interpleader to determine
which state was the true domicile. Because of the fact that the estate was insufficient to satisfy the claims of all the states, so that the claim of one would be
1 Massachusetts attempted to invoke jurisdiction under U. S. Constitution, art.
3, § 2: "The judicial power shall extend ••• to controversies between two or more
states; between a state and citizens of another state. • • • In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party,
the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." The case has been noted in 53
HARV. L. REV. 679 (1940); 34 ILL. L. REV. 610 (1940).
2 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98 (1930);
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436 (1930); Beidler v. South
Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1, 51 S. Ct. 54 (1930); First National Bank v.
Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174 (1932).
8 The whole history is too long to ~elate here. Suffice it to say that Dr. John
Dorrance died supposedly domiciled in New Jersey, though he had spent much of his
later days in Pennsylvania. Both states judicially determined that he had been domiciled therein and imposed inheritance taxes, Adding insult to injury, New Jersey
refused to allow any deductions for the Pennsylvania tax on the theory that the latter's
tax was invalid and that its statute allowed deductions only for valid taxes. The litigation came before the United States Supreme Court, in some form or another, about
eight times and before the state courts about seven times. The complete history may be
found in 37 M1cH. L. REv. 1279 (1939); Ohlander, "Double Inheritance Taxation,"
14 TAX MAG. 387 (1936); various phases are discussed in 34 CoL. L. REV. 1151,
1374 (1934); 18 MINN. L. REV. 736 (1934); 81 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 177 (1932),
which also contains a good discussion of this phase of double taxation.
'306 U.S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563 (1939).
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prejudiced, the Court found that a controversy existed. While distinguishing
that case from the present one, the Court apparently thought they were sufficiently similar to carry the test of a controversy over and apply it to this case.
There is an important distinction between these two cases, which must be
recognized. Under very recent decisions, another type of double taxation has
been recognized, which seems to be a regression from the position taken in the
1930-1932 cases. Where a settlor has created a trust of intangible property in
another state, reserving some degree of control over it, both the state of domicile
of the settlor and the state wherein the trustee resides may constitutionally impose
death taxes upon the transfer of such property. 5 The theory is that while such
a trust does not sufficiently sever the relationship between the owner and the
intangibles as to make the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam inapplicable, thus
precluding the state of domicile from imposing a tax, still the owner has so
subjected his property to the benefits and protection of the other state as to give
it a taxable situs there.6 Though it is not so stated in the case, it would seem
that Missouri was imposing its tax on the theory that the property had acquired
a "business" or "trust" situs there, while Massachusetts was taxing on the
theory of domicile of the settlor. Thus one difference between this case and
Texas v. Florida 1 is that, there, each state was taxing on the same theory-viz.,
that each was the domicile of the decedent,-:-while here, each state was taxing
on a different theory. However, the real difference would seem to be in the
specific question which the Court was asked to decide. In Texas v. Florida,8
it was which state was in fact decedent's domicile. Here, the question was of an
entirely different nature and involved the enforcement of the exemption provisions of the Missouri statute. The Missouri statute exempted intangible property of residents of states which offered reciprocal exemptions to citizens of
Missouri. 9 Massachusetts had such a statute exempting intangibles owned by
non-residents. 10 If Blake had reserved such control over the trusts as to be
termed the owner, accordi~g to the theory of Curry v. McCanless 11 and
5 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939); Graves v. Elliot,
307 U.S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913 (1939).
6 "In cases where the owner of intangibles confines his activity to the place of
his domicile it has been found convenient to substitute a rule for a reason ... by saying
that his intangibles are taxed at their situs and not elsewhere, or, perhaps less arti;.
ficially, by invoking the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam ••• which means only that
it is the identity or association of intangibles with the person of their owner at his
domicile which gives jurisdiction to tax. But when the taxpayer extends his activities
with respect to his intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protection and benefit of
the laws of another state, in such a way as to bring his person or property within the
reach of the tax gatherer there, the reason for a single place of taxation no longer
obtains, and the rule is not even a workable substitute for the reasons which may exist
in any particular case to support the constitutional power of each state concerned to
tax." Curry v. Mc_Canless, 307 U. S. 357 at 367, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939).
1 306 U. S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563 (1939).
8 Ibid.
9 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), § 576.
10 Mass. Laws Ann. (Michie, 1933), c. 65, § l.
11 307 U.S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 9'oo (1939).
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Graves v. Elliot,12 so that the estate was taxable in Massachusetts, then Missouri
could not, consistently with its statute, impose a tax on the trusts. On the other
hand, if Blake had not reserved such control as to be termed the owner, then
Massachusetts could not, consistent with its statute, impose its tax. The problem
was which state, under these statutes, had the exclusive right to tax these trusts.
Massachusetts attempted to use the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,18
and was met with the test of pecuniary interest in determining whether a controversy existed. If, as has been held, this jurisdiction was conferred upon the
Court as a substitute for diplomatic settlement of controversies and "is therefore
limited generally to disputes which, between States entirely independent, might
be properly the subject of diplomatic adjustment," 14 then it would seem that
invoking the original jurisdiction in this case was the logical, if not the only,
remedy. On the whole, there may be some doubts as to the soundness of the
proposition that a state h?is no interest in determining the proper place for an
inheritance tax except where double taxation makes it possible that the state will
lose money. The interest of the state should not be limited to a pecuniary interest.
Nor would it seem desirable that the interest be limited to a contractual right, as
stated in the opinion. The Court apparently had in mind a compact between
the states having the sanction of Congress.15 While admitting there is a strong
policy against opening the original jurisdiction to every case seeking to avoid
double taxation as it would burden the docket with much unnecessary litigation,
still there is much to be said for the proposition that states should be able to
secure for themselves and their citizens reciprocal rights by means of something
short of a formal compact, sanctioned by Congress, with some assurance that the
desired ends will be accomplished. And if the Supreme Court is not available
as a forum for the enforcement of such informal "agreements," where then is
the state to turn? 16 Double taxation is a product of our unique system of government, and it would seem to be a reproach to that government if it cannot
furnish some expedient device for avoiding such undesirable consequences.
Benjamin W. Franklin
12

307 U.S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913 (1939).
Massachusetts also attempted to invoke jurisdiction on the theory of a controversy between a state and citizens of another state; viz., a suit against the trustees for
collection of the tax. As the trustees were resisting on the ground that Massachusetts
had no jurisdiction, the same questions would have been involved. Holding that the
bill did not present this question, Hughes, C. J., said: "we are virtually asked . . .
to consider the bill as no longer asking a declaratory judgment as to which State has
power to tax, as not seeking relief in this Court 'sitting as a court of equity,' but, in
the light of the general prayer for other relief, as presenting a simple action against
the trustees to recover the amount of the tax claimed to be due Massachusetts irrespective of any claim of Missouri." Principal case, 308 U. S. I at 18.
14
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 at 373, 44 S. Ct. 138 (1923).
15 U. S. Constitution, art. 1, § 10, 1f 3: "No state shall, without the consent
of congress ..• enter into any agreement or compact with another state.•.."
16
Counsel for Massachusetts said: "If the evils of multiple taxation are to be
solved by reciprocal legislation of the States, as this Court has itself suggested, it is
essential that there be a forum where recalcitrant States may be compelled to observe
the reciprocity their legislatures have provided. The Supreme Court is the only available forum." 308 U. S. 1 at 4.
18

